CAMS is the record-keeper of India's mutual-fund boom, handling two-thirds of the nation's fund assets with a near-duopoly and a 47% return on capital, but its fee per rupee keeps eroding, and the price leaves no room for disappointment.
CAMS is a picks-and-shovels play on the mutual-fund industry, taking a small tax on the assets flowing through its pipes.
Mutual funds cannot run on their own. A fund house buys and sells securities; CAMS records who owns what, processes transactions in real time, and keeps the regulatory books. A fund house that tried to switch this plumbing mid-operation would face months of migration risk with investors' money live on the line, which is why almost none do.
Why has no one else already won? Because the mutual-fund boom is recent and still consolidating. India's retail investors only turned to mutual funds seriously in the last 15 years; before that, the industry was sleepy. CAMS built dominance by being first and reliable. It won because scale networks reward speed and integration, but the game is not over: KFin, its rival, still holds a third of the market and could take market share if CAMS stumbles. The moat is deep but requires keeping every client happy, because switching costs, while high, are not impossible if you fail to evolve.
Mental model heatmap
★★★★★
Switching Costs and Integration
The real lock-in is not a network effect (CAMS does not get more useful to one fund house because another fund house joined). It is integration depth: a fund house wires its entire operation into CAMS over years, so moving to KFin means a risky mid-flight migration under the regulator's eye. That is why CAMS has held 68% share for years.
★★★★★
Duopoly Economics
Two players splitting a market where size is a barrier to entry. CAMS has 68%, KFin has 31%, and nobody else has more than 1%. This is where CAMS's market power lives: it keeps clients and holds off rivals.
★★★★★
Price-Setting Power
CAMS has strong market power (it retains clients and fends off KFin, see Duopoly Economics) but weak price-setting power. It cannot lift its fee rate, because the fund houses it serves are themselves concentrated and are squeezed by SEBI's expense-ratio caps, and that squeeze flows straight through to the RTA fee. Market power and price-setting power are not the same thing.
★★★★★
When Scale Compresses the Take Rate
Revenue growth is roughly AUM growth plus the change in the take rate (the fee CAMS keeps per rupee). If AUM grows 15% but the take rate falls 7%, revenue grows only about 8%. Scale is not the villain; the pricing curve attached to scale is. Bigger assets can arrive with structurally thinner unit economics.
★★★★★
Regulatory Moat
SEBI's stringent rules on RTA competence, integration, and reliability mean that only a few firms can legally operate. CAMS benefits from this barrier. The same regulator, though, caps the fund's total expense ratio, and that cap squeezes what fund houses can pay every vendor, the RTA included.
Economic engine
Assets Under Administration
₹52-55 lakh crore in mutual-fund assets
This is the fuel: as Indians put more money into mutual funds, CAMS's asset base grows, but not its fee rate.
Fee Rate
Basis points per rupee of AUM (hundredths of a percent)
The rate falls as AUM rises. Bigger AUM = lower percentage fee. This is the structural squeeze.
Transaction Volume
1,070 million transactions processed in FY26
The busier CAMS gets, the more it can absorb incremental transactions at falling unit costs, but higher volume alone cannot offset lower rates.
Operating Leverage
High in the core RTA business; lower in non-MF ventures
The core business has reached scale; incremental transactions are cheap. New businesses (payments, KYC, insurance repositories) do not yet benefit from the same economies.
Capital Requirement
Very light; almost no capex needed
CAMS needs computers and compliance, not factories or warehouses. This is why it converts so much profit to cash.
Strategic position
CAMS
Market leader by far, 68% share, integrated with 18 of 46 fund houses, including 10 of the top 15. First-mover with deep, expensive switching costs.
↓
KFin Technologies
Rival RTA with 31% share, fewer major clients, lower scale. But a credible alternative, preventing complacency.
↓
New non-RTA players
CAMS diversifying into payments, account aggregators, KYC registry, insurance repo. Still small, 14% of revenue, but growing fast at 24-25%. Could reduce RTA dependency over time if they scale.
Why now
CAMS is expensive because it earns 47% on capital and India's mutual-fund boom is real. The stock prices in (1) continued AUM growth, (2) market share stability or gains, and (3) non-MF revenue diversification all succeeding. None of this is impossible. But the stock P/E of 38 times earnings is a no-margin-for-error bet. If fee compression accelerates, or if AUM growth slows, or if non-MF businesses do not scale, the multiple can halve while the business remains sound.
What the market is betting on
CAMS continues to take market share from KFin, extending its 68-31 lead. This is possible but not guaranteed.
India's mutual-fund AUM keeps growing through SIP culture and rising retail participation. This is likely.
The non-MF businesses (payments, KRA, account aggregator, insurance repository) scale to 25-30% of revenue and grow at double-digit rates. This is the bull case.
Fee compression slows or stabilizes as scale reaches a ceiling and SEBI settles on a new normal. This is uncertain.
CAMS maintains 45% net profit margins and 47% ROCE even as it diversifies. This assumes no value destruction in new ventures.
Why it is winning
CAMS owns 68% of the RTA market while KFin has 31%. That duopoly gives it client retention and protection from new entrants (though not the power to raise its fee rate).
It processes 1,070 million transactions and services 18 of 46 fund houses, embedding itself so deeply that switching is terrifying for a fund house.
It has almost no capital requirements, no inventory, no physical assets. FY26 operating cash flow was about 124% of net profit, and free cash flow after capex was about 94%.
Its return on capital (ROCE) is 47%, among the highest in Indian finance. It is making a fortune on minimal capital.
India's mutual-fund AUM is still growing, and the SIP culture is embedding. The assets it services will keep climbing.
Why it could stop winning
Its fee rate is negotiated downward every few years as SEBI and fund houses demand better economics at scale. This compression is structural, not cyclical.
The mutual-fund industry is concentrated among a few large asset managers, giving them leverage in fee negotiations. CAMS cannot walk away.
A market downturn could freeze mutual-fund purchases and slow AUM growth, hitting revenues even though CAMS did nothing wrong.
KFin or a new entrant could win over fund houses by offering better tech or service. Switching costs are high but not immovable.
The non-MF businesses are still small and have not proven they can grow as fast or as profitably as the core. If they do not scale, CAMS remains a one-trick pony.
Sector mental models
Mutual-Fund Penetration
Rising but still low. India's mutual-fund AUM is ₹52-55 lakh crore; household financial savings are much larger. Runway exists, but saturation is a 20-30 year story, not a 5-year one.
Slower adoption than equity bulls assume.
Fee Regulation
Tightening, but indirectly. SEBI does not set the RTA's price line by line; it caps the fund's total expense ratio and lowers that cap as funds scale, which squeezes every vendor the fund pays.
Structural headwind for CAMS, transmitted through the AMCs.
Technology as Differentiator
Emerging. Non-RTA businesses (payments, KYC, insurance repos) rely on tech and APIs. CAMS must stay ahead or cede ground to specialist players.
CAMS is an incumbent in RTA; a novice in fintech.
Duopoly Stability
Stable. Regulators and fund houses are satisfied with CAMS and KFin. New RTAs are unlikely; the two-player game is entrenched.
CAMS benefits from this, but cannot raise prices because of it.
One sentence to remember
CAMS is a toll collector on India's mutual-fund highway. As long as the highway grows, so does CAMS. But toll rates fall as traffic rises, so CAMS's job is to take market share and diversify, not to sit back and compound.
01Company Overview
CAMS does not manage a single rupee of money. It is a Registrar and Transfer Agent (RTA), which means it is the back office that processes every time someone buys a mutual fund, sells it, or sets up a regular monthly investment (an SIP). Think of it like the records department at a hospital: you do not see it, but nothing works without it. CAMS earns its fee as a fraction of every rupee it services. That sounds simple until you realize that as mutual-fund assets grow, CAMS negotiates to charge less per rupee because it is handling so much volume. The tension lives there: its assets surge but its percentage fee slides downward, so revenue growth lags miles behind the assets it is minding.
02Business Model & Industry
Unit of revenue: Basis points per rupee of mutual-fund assets under administration, plus transaction fees and new non-MF service revenue.
Model: CAMS earns a fee measured in basis points (hundredths of a percent) on the assets it services. A fund house holding ₹100 crore in assets pays CAMS a percentage of that, negotiated based on scale. As total AUM grows, the negotiated rate per rupee falls. The pressure is not that SEBI fixes the RTA's price directly; it is that SEBI caps the fund's total expense ratio (the total annual cost a fund can charge investors) and tightens that cap as the fund grows, so the fund house has less to hand every vendor, and the RTA's slice compresses along with it.
Mutual-fund RTA services86%
Highest margins, 45-50% OPM. Core business. Fee compression is the long-term risk.
Lower margins initially, but growing fast at 24-25% YoY. Could become a pillar if scaled.
Structure
Two-player RTA market with CAMS at 68% and KFin at 31%. The barrier to entry is not capital (an RTA is asset-light, which is the whole appeal of the business). It is regulatory approval, decades of operational track record, and the integration depth that makes fund houses reluctant to switch. No third player has more than 1%. This is a duopoly by trust and integration, not by capital.
Competitors
KFin Technologies is the only meaningful rival. It has been trying to grow share for years; CAMS has held steady at 68%, which shows either very high switching costs or very good service, probably both.
Pricing power
Split the idea in two. CAMS has strong market power (it retains clients and holds off KFin) but weak price-setting power (it cannot lift its fee rate). Three reasons it cannot: the fund houses it serves are themselves concentrated (the top 15 AMCs are a huge share of AUM) and negotiate hard, SEBI's tightening expense-ratio caps squeeze what those AMCs can pay, and a bigger book is contractually priced at a lower rate per rupee. So the moat defends CAMS's share and its cash flow, not its ability to charge more.
Demand driver
Retail investor participation in mutual funds, driven by SIP culture, rising income, and equity market performance. As Indians' financial literacy and confidence grow, mutual funds are the 'safe' place to invest equity gains. This is a real trend, but penetration is still low compared to developed markets. (Cyclical in the short term (equity market booms pull in retail), structural in the long term (more Indians investing). CAMS is exposed to both.)
TAM
Very large. Mutual-fund AUM could double or triple over 10 years as retail participation rises. But remember the take-rate mechanism: a bigger asset base does not translate one-for-one into CAMS revenue, because the fee per rupee keeps sliding as those assets grow. The pool expands; CAMS's cut of each rupee shrinks.
Penetration
Still low. Mutual funds are 5-7% of household financial savings in India. In the US, the figure is much higher. Runway exists, but growth is not explosive.
Value-chain seat
CAMS is the back-office plumbing. It does not manage money or take principal risk. It is a utility playing a critical role, with a duopoly structure that protects it but not prices it.
The business is dominant and unusually capital-light: 68% market share, 47% ROCE, almost no capex, and FY26 operating cash flow about 124% of net profit. It has compounded revenue and profit at mid-to-high teens over five years, but that engine is now slowing as the fee rate compresses, which is why it is no longer an obvious high-growth compounder from here. It is a toll collector in a growing market where the tolls are negotiated down as traffic rises, and that is the nature of the model rather than a flaw in it. To turn buyable, you would want faster non-MF growth, a halt to fee compression, or CAMS taking meaningful share from KFin. Today it is a mature, dominant, high-quality business whose core growth engine is decelerating.
03Valuation Snapshot
Market Cap
₹18,926 cr
Stock Price
₹762
52W High / Low
₹845 / ₹611
Stock P/E
38.2
price/EPS ≈ 40; on 6.6% FY26 revenue growth
P/B
14.3
book value ₹53.3
EPS (FY26)
₹19.20
Book Value
₹53.3
Dividend Yield
1.64%
Q4 FY26 ₹4/share, payout ~71%
04Financial Performance (5Y, in Crores)
FY22
₹910net ₹287 · 31.5%
FY23
₹972net ₹285 · 29.3%
FY24
₹1,137net ₹351 · 30.9%
FY25
₹1,422net ₹465 · 32.7%
FY26
₹1,516net ₹472 · 31.1%
RevenueNet profit₹ crore · % = PAT margin
05Key Ratios
ROE (3Y avg)
39.9%
FY26 was 36.3%
ROCE
47.0%
nearly as high as ROE; minimal debt and capex
OPM
~45%
stable high margins
Book Value / Share
₹53.3
Debt / Equity
Minimal
borrowings ~₹64 cr vs cash ₹571 cr
06Cash Flow Forensics (in Crores)
FY26
OCF₹584Capex₹270FCF₹444
It pays to be precise about the two cash measures rather than reach for a superlative. FY26 operating cash flow was ₹584 crore, about 124% of the ₹472 crore net profit (the business collects quickly and books little that is non-cash). After ₹270 crore of capex, free cash flow was ₹444 crore, about 94% of net profit. So on an operating basis it turns more than a rupee of cash for every rupee of profit, and even after reinvestment it keeps most of it. We do not have reliable prior-year OCF data, so we show FY26 alone. That cash funds dividends and a treasury buildup (current investments ₹571 crore); the company is nearly debt-free.
07Growth
Sales CAGR 5Y
17%
Sales CAGR 3Y
16%
Profit CAGR 5Y
21%
Profit CAGR 3Y
17%
FY26 Revenue Growth
6.6%
slowdown vs history; fee compression showing
FY26 Profit Growth
1.2%
barely grew despite strong AUM backdrop
Stock CAGR 1Y
~Flat
Stock CAGR 5Y
~Modest
multiple compression after the boom
08Management
CAMS is widely held after Warburg Pincus and Great Terrain exited. There is no promoter group pulling strings. The board and management are professional, execution-focused, and have held dominance in core RTA while diversifying into non-MF. The moat does much of the work: switching costs, regulatory entry barriers, and track record protect the business more than any leader's decisions. Management's job now is to accelerate non-MF growth to offset core RTA fee compression. If they can build those businesses to 25-30% of revenue at healthy margins, CAMS changes shape. That has not happened yet; non-MF is still 14% and may take years to scale.
09Shareholding
44.88%
23.54%
31.56%
FII 44.88%DII 23.54%Retail 31.56%
10Moat
wide moat
Duopoly structure with 68% market share vs KFin's 31%
Switching costs for fund houses extremely high (years of integration, regulatory approvals, operational risk)
Regulatory barriers to entry: RTAs need SEBI approval and a long operational track record
Installed base and integration depth: fund houses are wired into CAMS over years
First-mover advantage: CAMS reached scale first and set the integration standard
The moat is wide and real, but be precise about what kind it is. It is an integration and switching-cost moat, not a network effect (CAMS does not become more useful to one fund house because another signs up). A fund house cannot leave without a risky operational migration, and SEBI values stability, so new entrants are rare. The crucial caveat: this wide moat defends share and cash flow, not price. It does not confer price-setting power, because the fund houses are concentrated and SEBI's expense-ratio caps squeeze what they can pay. CAMS is a toll collector with deep roots but negotiated tolls.
11The Story So Far
CAMS was built in an era when India's mutual-fund market was fragmented and growing. It won because it was reliable, early, and integrated deeply with fund houses. Over 15 years, it grew from a startup to the largest RTA, collecting a fee on the mushrooming AUM of India's retail mutual-fund boom. Revenue and profit climbed steadily as assets flowed in. Then came the squeeze. As AUM grew to ₹50 lakh crore and beyond, SEBI and fund houses began pushing back on fees. CAMS could not refuse: it is not like you have a choice of RTAs. The fee rate per rupee began to compress. FY26 told the story starkly: mutual-fund AUM was booming, but CAMS's revenue growth slowed to 6.6% and profit growth collapsed to 1.2%. The answer, CAMS hopes, is to diversify: payments, KYC, account aggregator, insurance repository. Those businesses grew 24-25% last quarter, a stark contrast to RTA's crawl. But they are still only 14% of revenue and have not yet proven they can reach the scale and profitability of the core.
Price action (12M): CAMS stock has been roughly flat over the past year, hovering near its 52-week high of ₹845 despite the slowdown in profit growth. This is not a story of a crash or a recovery. It is a premium-priced business trading sideways while people argue about its future. The market is willing to pay 38 times earnings because of the moat, the exceptional returns on capital, and the hope that non-MF diversification works. But that price leaves zero room for error: if fee compression accelerates, or if non-MF growth disappoints, the multiple can fall even though the business remains sound.
12Risks
Fee compression accelerating: SEBI could tighten the expense-ratio cap faster than expected, or fund houses could band together and demand deeper cuts. CAMS cannot refuse. If AUM grows 12% but the take rate falls 3%, revenue grows only about 9%. High.
Mutual-fund growth slowdown: A market correction or recession could freeze retail participation in mutual funds, slowing AUM growth to single digits. CAMS would be a bystander in its own downturn. High.
KFin gaining share: KFin could win over a major fund house with better tech or service. CAMS's 68-31 split could tighten. If KFin goes to 40%, it has pricing leverage. Medium.
Non-MF businesses not scaling: Payments, KYC, insurance repo are all competitive, fast-moving spaces. CAMS is an incumbent in RTA, a novice in fintech. If these businesses never exceed 20% of revenue and never match RTA margins, CAMS stays a one-trick pony forever. High.
Regulatory tightening: SEBI could impose new compliance costs on RTAs, or require capital charges for assets under administration, cutting into returns. Medium.
Valuation compression: Even if the business is fine, a re-rating from 38x to 25x earnings would hurt a buyer today. That is a multiple risk, not a business risk, but it is real. Medium.
13Where the Numbers Could Mislead
✓
Profit backed by cash
FY26 OCF ₹584 cr vs profit ₹472 cr, so operating cash flow ran ahead of reported profit.
✕
Profit growth
FY26 profit grew only 1.2% despite AUM strength. Fee compression is eating growth.
✓
Return on capital
ROCE 47%, ROE 36-40%, and the returns are cash-backed rather than accounting artefacts.
✓
Capital intensity
Minimal capex, minimal inventory. Almost pure profit drops to cash. Structural advantage.
✓
Competitive moat
Duopoly, switching costs, regulatory barriers. Moat is real and wide.
✕
Valuation vs growth
P/E 38 for 6.6% revenue growth and 1% profit growth. Price is stretched for the growth offered.
SEBI tightens the fund's expense-ratio cap as AUM grows, which squeezes what fund houses can pay the RTA. This is the core long-term risk, transmitted through the AMCs.
✓
Market-share stability vs KFin
CAMS has held 68% share for years. Switching costs are too high for rapid shift, but complacency is dangerous.
!
Non-MF diversification potential
New businesses (payments, KYC, insurance repo) are 14% of revenue, growing fast (24-25%), but unproven at scale and profitability. This is the hope; execution risk is real.
14Two-Engine Assessment
Earnings engine
The earnings engine has stalled. Despite the mutual-fund AUM being strong and CAMS processing 1,070 million transactions, FY26 profit grew only 1.2%. The culprit is fee compression: the rate per rupee of AUM is falling faster than volume can compensate. FY26 revenue grew 6.6%, a far cry from the historical 16-17% sales CAGR. Profit margins held at 31% (stable), so the slowdown is all growth. This is a structural squeeze, not a cyclical dip. For the earnings engine to wake, CAMS would need to either win back fee rates (unlikely given SEBI's stance), accelerate non-MF to 25-30% of revenue at high margins (not there yet), or see AUM growth spike to 20%+ (possible but not assured).
Multiple engine
CAMS trades at 38 times earnings and 14.3 times book. Rather than just call that expensive, ask what future growth the price already assumes. A 38x multiple on a stable-quality business roughly prices in low-to-mid teens earnings growth sustained for years. FY26 delivered 1.2%. So the price is not paying for what CAMS is doing now; it is paying for a reacceleration.
Rather than assert a fair value, walk the arithmetic. Start at today's ₹762 and FY26 earnings of ₹19.20 a share, and look out three years. Bear: fee compression keeps outpacing volume and non-MF stays sub-15%, so earnings compound about 3% a year to roughly ₹21. A stalled compounder does not hold 38x, so the multiple de-rates to about 22x. Implied price 21 times 22 is roughly ₹460, about -15% a year including the fall. Base: AUM compounds in the low teens and non-MF reaches about 20% of revenue, so earnings compound about 11% to roughly ₹26.3, and the multiple eases to about 30x. Implied price 26.3 times 30 is about ₹790, roughly +1% a year, because the de-rating hands back what the earnings add. Bull: non-MF scales past 30% of revenue at good margins and take-rate compression stabilises, earnings compound about 16% to roughly ₹30, and the premium multiple holds near 35x. Implied price 30 times 35 is roughly ₹1,050, about +11% a year. The asymmetry is the point: the base case pays almost nothing, the bull needs two things to go right at once, and the bear is a real de-rating. That is a hold, not a buy. The terminal multiples reflect how the market would likely reprice CAMS: near 22x if it is treated as a low-growth utility, around 30x as a steady dominant compounder, near 35x if the non-MF engine restores a growth story. These are illustrative scenarios, not forecasts. The dials that decide the path are in the outlook below.
15Mental-Model Lenses
Picks and shovels
CAMS does not manage money or take principal risk. It is the toolmaker for the mutual-fund industry: as long as Indians buy mutual funds, CAMS collects a fee. That isolation from market direction cuts both ways. It protects CAMS when sentiment sours, but it also means CAMS does not grow if participation does not grow, and cannot raise prices even if assets soar. It is an indirect bet on retail financial inclusion, with the fee rate as the catch.
The sliding fee
CAMS's revenue model is inherently deflationary. As AUM grows, the fee rate falls, so revenue trails the assets it services (the take-rate mechanism in the mental models). FY26 proved it: strong AUM growth, but only 6.6% revenue growth and 1.2% profit growth. The pressure runs through the ecosystem: SEBI tightens the fund's expense-ratio cap, the fund houses pass the squeeze to their vendors, and the RTA's slice compresses. For CAMS to grow into its valuation, the non-MF businesses must more than compensate, rising from 14% of revenue today toward 30-40% over a decade. That is the bet.
Duopoly without pricing power
CAMS is in a rare position: a duopolist that cannot raise prices. The duopoly protects it from new entrants and from KFin's aggression, but it cannot turn that market power into price-setting power. The reason is on the customer side: the fund houses it serves are themselves concentrated and are squeezed by SEBI's expense-ratio caps, so their willingness to pay is constrained, and CAMS cannot walk away from them. Margin protection (the duopoly stops rivals undercutting it) without margin expansion (the customers, squeezed from above, have little room to pay more). It is a profitable moat, not a pricing-power moat.
The non-MF bet
CAMS is diversifying into payments, account aggregators, KYC registry, and insurance repositories. These businesses are growing at 24-25%, a stark contrast to RTA's 6.6%. But they are small (14% of revenue), competitive (every bank and fintech is trying), and unproven at CAMS's scale. CAMS is an incumbent in RTA, a challenger in fintech. If non-MF reaches 30% of revenue by 2030 and still grows faster than RTA, the story works. If it stays at 14-18%, CAMS remains a mature RTA business with limited growth. This lens asks: can CAMS transition from a one-product business to a platform? The answer will decide if 38x earnings is justified or excessive.
16Outlook: What Happens Next?
The verdict rests on a few measurable dials, not on a story. Here is what we are watching, and the reading that would move us in either direction.
01
The take rate (the core mechanism)
FY26 revenue grew 6.6% while mutual-fund AUM grew faster, so the fee kept per rupee fell again.
Profit grew just 1.2%, the compression showing up in full despite a strong market.
What to watchDoes the gap between AUM growth and revenue growth narrow? Revenue growth climbing back toward AUM growth means compression is stabilising (the constructive signal). Revenue trailing AUM by 5 or more points, year after year, means the squeeze is still winning (the bearish one).
02
The non-MF engine
Non-MF (payments, KYC registry, account aggregator, insurance repository) is about 14% of revenue.
It grew roughly 24-25% year on year last quarter, far faster than the RTA core.
What to watchDoes non-MF cross 20%, then 25-30%, of revenue at healthy margins? Reaching 20%+ is the bull trigger, because a second engine finally offsets the fee squeeze. Stalling below 15% for a few more years is the bear signal, leaving CAMS a one-engine business.
03
Market share versus KFin
CAMS has held about 68% RTA share against KFin's 31% for years.
Share is stable, not rising.
What to watchDoes CAMS hold or gain share, or does KFin win a large asset manager? A move by KFin toward 40% would hand it negotiating leverage and crack the duopoly's stability, which is the quiet assumption under the whole thesis.
Reread these each results season. The verdict turns more constructive if take-rate compression stabilises and non-MF crosses 20% of revenue; it weakens if the compression accelerates while non-MF stays small.
17Summary
CAMS holds a 68-31 duopoly, earns 47% ROCE on almost no capital, and converts nearly all its profit to cash. None of that is in doubt. What holds it back is the price. You pay 38 times earnings for a company whose profit grew 1.2% last year, because its fee rate is squeezed downward even as the assets it services grow. This is not a company falling apart; it is a toll collector whose tolls are negotiated down as traffic rises, betting on its non-MF businesses to replace the lost growth. That bet is plausible but unproven. So the price already assumes the non-MF engine works and fee compression eases, and if either misfires the multiple has room to fall. Not a conviction buy. Worth watching if non-MF accelerates or the valuation compresses. Do your own work and consult a SEBI-registered adviser.